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Abstract. Permissivism says that for some propositions and bodies of evidence, there is more than one rationally 
permissible doxastic attitude that can be taken towards that proposition given the evidence. Some critics of this 
view argue that it condones, as rationally acceptable, sets of attitudes that manifest an untenable kind of 
arbitrariness. I begin by providing a new and more detailed explication of what this alleged arbitrariness consists in. 
I then explain why Miriam Schoenfield’s prima facie promising attempt to answer the Arbitrariness Objection, by 
appealing to the role of epistemic standards in rational belief formation, fails to resolve the problem. Schoenfield’s 
strategy is, however, a useful one, and I go on to explain how an alternative form of the standards-based approach 
to Permissivism – one that emphasizes the significance of the relationship between people’s cognitive abilities and 
the epistemic standards that they employ – can respond to the arbitrariness objection. 
 
1. Introduction 
Uniqueness is the view that, for a given proposition, P, “there is just one rationally permissible doxastic 
attitude one can take, given a particular body of evidence” (White 2014: 312). Permissivism is the denial of 
Uniqueness. Permissivists say that, for at least some values of P, and bodies of evidence, E, there is more 
than one rationally permissible doxastic attitude vis-à-vis P.1 Advocates of Uniqueness in the recent 
                                                          
1 In recent work White distinguishes between Strong and Moderate Permissivism. The former accepts the in-principle rational 
permissibility of believing either P or ~P given evidence E, whereas the latter only accepts the in-principle rational permissibility 
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literature include Roger White (2005, 2014), David Christensen (2007), Richard Feldman (2006, 2007), 
and Jonathan Matheson (2011). Authors who criticise Uniqueness and thereby endorse Permissivism 
include Igor Douven (2009), Earl Conee (2010), Ballantyne and Coffman (2011, 2012), Brueckner and 
Bundy (2012), Luis Rosa (2012), Miriam Schoenfield (2012, 2014), and Thomas Kelly (2014).  
My aim here is to elaborate upon – and then reply to – one type of argument that has been given 
against Permissivism. Briefly put, the complaint is that Permissivism endorses, as rationally permissible, 
sets of attitudes which manifest a kind of untenable arbitrariness. I’ll call this The Arbitrariness Objection, 
or TAO for short. Why take a special interest in TAO? The dialectic can be understood as follows. To 
reject Permissivism is to reject a whole array of plausible theses about the probative relationship between 
evidence and propositions, and about the nature of doxastic justification.2 So we should be loath to reject 
Permissivism. But we still have to ask whether Permissivism carries with it any disqualifying costs. One 
(arguable) cost of Permissivism is that it seems difficult to reconcile with popular Conciliationist views – 
roughly: views which say that disagreeing epistemic peers should revise their beliefs ‘towards’ their rival’s 
belief – that some authors have recently defended (e.g. Elga 2007, 2010; Feldman 2006, 2007; Christensen 
2007). This aspect of the Permissivism v. Uniqueness debate has received considerable attention.3 By 
                                                          
of different credences towards P given E, e.g. 0.5 and 0.7. The challenges to Permissivism that I’m examining here can be read as 
challenges to Moderate Permissivism, the less extreme, more prima facie plausible version of the view.  
2 In sum, rejecting Permissivism and accepting Uniqueness imperils any epistemological view on which what it’s rational for A to 
believe about P, given evidence, E, is at least partly a function of A’s prior doxastic attitudes (either towards P, e.g. her Bayesian 
priors, or towards other propositions, e.g. as in a Coherentist framework). For this reason, as several authors have observed 
(White 2005; Douven 2009; Ballantyne and Coffman 2011; Schoenfield 2014), Bayesians, Coherentists, and Epistemological 
Conservatives are all presumptively opposed to Uniqueness. It would be misleading, though, to suggest that if TAO is set aside, 
all the relevant intuitive considerations in this debate favor Permissivism. Matheson (2011) and White (2014) both offer 
arguments for Uniqueness that stand or fall independently of TAO, though I won’t discuss these here. 
3 The natural reading of the relationship between these views is that Permissivism undermines Conciliationism, because an 
epistemically well-credentialed agent, B, disagreeing with A’s doxastic attitude towards P (given the same evidence, E) doesn’t 
give A any reason to revise her doxastic attitude, if – as per Permissivism – it remains possible that both A and B hold doxastic 
attitudes towards P given E which are fully rationally permissible (see White 2014: 213). Having said that, Elga (2010), Ballantyne 
and Coffman (2012), and Christensen (forthcoming) all claim that there are ways to motivate Conciliationism that are fully 
compatible with Permissivism. In Christensen, the idea is that even if person A judges that both doxastic attitudes towards P 
given E (B’s and her own) are rationally permissible, she may still judge that the discrepancy between B’s doxastic attitude and 
her own supplies her with (i) a reason to doubt the accuracy of her doxastic attitude, and (ii) a reason to think her doxastic attitude 
would be more accurate if she revised it ‘in the direction’ of B’s attitude. At any rate, if the viability of Conciliationism doesn’t 
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contrast, the concerns adverted to in TAO – while they are linked to those addressed in discussions of 
Conciliationism – have received rather less attention. If we are going to endorse Permissivism, then we 
need to satisfy ourselves that there isn’t anything unacceptably arbitrary about this position.  
The paper is structured as follows. In §2 I try to more clearly identify what the defects are that 
TAO ascribes to Permissivism, and to identify the commitments within Permissivism which give rise to 
TAO. I’ll summarize White’s formulation of TAO, and then introduce two examples which demonstrate 
– in a way that’s intended to amplify White’s concerns – how Permissivism can end up recommending 
conflicting courses of action in practical decision-making. Such pragmatic conflicts provide the best 
representation of the type of untenable arbitrariness that TAO attributes to Permissivism.  
In §3 I develop a reply to TAO which builds upon Miriam Schoenfield’s response to White. She 
says that the arbitrariness White adverts to isn’t intolerable, as long as the agent’s ‘arbitrary’ beliefs result 
from her application of some rationally permissible set of epistemic standards. So, suppose agent A holds 
doxastic attitude DA1, while simultaneously affirming the rational permissibility of B’s doxastic attitude, 
DA2. A is meant to be able to say something like this: ‘I hold DA1 because it’s the doxastic attitude that’s 
enjoined by my epistemic standards, but it is rationally permissible for person B to hold DA2, if that’s the 
doxastic attitude enjoined by his epistemic standards (assuming those standards reach some baseline level 
of rationality)’.4 I don’t think that this reply to TAO quite works. It guards Permissivism against a charge 
of irrational arbitrariness with respect to belief, but leaves it open to a charge of arbitrariness with respect 
to epistemic standards. However, something like Schoenfield’s reply to TAO is viable, and I’ll present a 
version of this reply that can withstand the charge of arbitrariness at the level of epistemic standards. The 
crucial move is to postulate an interplay between A’s cognitive abilities and the truth-conduciveness of 
the epistemic standards that she employs. My proposal supports the view that it can be rational for A to 
follow epistemic standards ES1, even while she (i) grants the rational permissibility of B’s use of standards 
ES2, and (ii) judges that, qua epistemic standards, ES1 isn’t rationally superior to ES2. 
                                                          
hinge on Permissivism, then the significance of TAO for Permissivism is greater than it would be otherwise, since the problems 
TAO raises would rank more prominently among the costs of accepting Permissivism. 
4 Conee (2010) and Sosa (2010) both advance views similar to this, although the idea doing most of the work in their defences of 
Permissivism is that some evidence (e.g. some intuitions) aren’t fully shareable. This is plausible, but it doesn’t support the view 
that agents can be equally rational forming different doxastic attitudes towards P based on the very same evidence. 
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In §4 I conclude with a discussion of the features of the kind of standards-based Permissivism 
that’s suggested by this reply to TAO. In particular, I’ll discuss how it is more demanding than certain 
other permissive epistemologies, and explain why this is a feature rather than a bug, so to speak.  
2. Unpacking the arbitrariness objection 
2.1 In what way is Permissivism arbitrary? 
Permissive epistemologies deny that there is always one unique, rationally permissible doxastic attitude 
that an agent can hold towards proposition P on the basis of a body of evidence E. On its face, there’s 
nothing arbitrary about a Permissivist stance, thus understood. Permissivism just expresses a – prima facie 
plausible – view about what’s rational when it comes to judgments about how evidence probatively bears 
upon propositions. Almost any example of evidence bearing on a proposition can be used to illustrate 
this. Say we’re trying to figure out who left the dirty dishes on the counter, and we gather together a few 
scraps of evidence which point to Anne as the likely culprit, though without being sufficient to confirm 
her guilt beyond all doubt. In such a case, it seems much more plausible to say something in the spirit of 
Permissivism than something in the spirit of Uniqueness. It seems much more plausible to say 
 
There is a plurality of doxastic attitudes – namely, those which express more confidence than 50/50 
ambivalence, but less confidence than complete certainty – which someone could rationally hold 
towards proposition P [Anne left the dishes on the counter], given our evidence, E 
 
Than it is to say 
 
There’s only one rationally permissible doxastic attitude to hold towards P given E, and it is a 
credence of N, where N stands for a precise probability or probability interval >0.5 and <1.0. 
 
When the rival views are portrayed this way, Uniqueness appears to be extraordinarily strict. In Kelly’s 
words (2014: 298), proponents of Uniqueness seem to be saying that there’s never any ‘slack’, when it 
comes to the relationship between the evidence and what it’s rational to believe. Given the same evidence, 
if A believes it’s 50-70% likely that Anne left the dishes out, and B believes this is 70-90% likely, then 
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Uniqueness says that it’s necessary that one of these beliefs is irrational. And because that seems absurd, 
Uniqueness is false.5 A number of authors have criticised Uniqueness along these lines.6 
These bizarre implications are one reason why we should be loath to endorse Uniqueness. As I 
said in §1, though, even if Uniqueness looks implausible, we still have to see whether Permissivism has 
untoward costs, and so we still have to examine TAO. The worry TAO raises for Permissivism is about 
the way an agent’s attitudes ‘hang together’ once she consciously affirms a permissive set of judgments, 
for any matter on which she holds a determinate doxastic attitude, DA1. Here’s a rough formulation of 
the problem, in second-personal terms. If you say DA1 and DA2 are both rationally permissible doxastic 
attitudes to hold towards P given E, it’s hard to see what reasons you could have – other than arbitrary 
reasons, like what’s more fun to believe – for singling out either of these as your belief. Once you’ve 
registered the notion that both DA1 and DA2 are, by your own lights, rationally permissible, it’s arbitrary 
to accept one in preference to the other. In this situation, you can figure out which out of DA1 or DA2 
ultimately seems rationally superior, thus abandoning the judgment that they’re equally rationally eligible. 
Or, if you’re staunchly committed to the judgment about their parity, you can adopt a doxastic attitude 
that expresses this – like a partial endorsement of both DA1 and DA2 – and affirm this as the rationally 
appropriate doxastic attitude to hold towards P given E. But in either case, ridding your attitudes of the 
arbitrariness will involve you revising your beliefs away from the kind permissive stance which affirms the 
rational permissibility of more than one doxastic attitude towards P in light of E.7 
                                                          
5 As Ballantye and Coffman (2012: 659–60) observe, Uniqueness affirms the already demanding requirements that come with 
Evidentialism – which says that doxastic attitudes concerning P are only justified if they represent a fitting response to one’s P-
relevant evidence – and adds a further requirement, that fittingness relationships between sets of evidence and propositions are 
singularly prescriptive, such that any set of evidence renders fitting only one doxastic attitude in relation to any proposition. 
6 See for instance Douven (2009), and Rosa (2012), both of whom press the idea that complicated bodies of evidence are open to 
a plurality credible interpretations. Some remarks to this effect by Gideon Rosen are now routinely cited in this literature and in 
the disagreement literature; Rosen says “it should be obvious that reasonable people can disagree, even when confronted with a 
single body of evidence... it would appear to be a fact of epistemic life that a careful review of the evidence does not guarantee 
consensus even among thoughtful and otherwise rational investigators” (2001: 71-72). 
7 Christensen’s work in this area (especially 2010) notes the ‘rationally toxic’ nature of higher-order evidence, HOE, i.e. evidence 
relative to a doxastic attitude, DA, whose probative force consists in it indicating the rational sub-optimality of the processes by 
which DA was formed. HOE is rationally toxic, since once you consider it you’re left to choose between two doxastic responses 
– either (i) revising DA in light of HOE, and thus holding a belief that’s not governed by your own appraisal of the first-order 
evidence’s probative force, or (ii) holding firm in DA, and thus not taking account of HOE’s higher-order probative force – 
which both involve some rational failing in your response to the (total) evidence. One way of characterizing Permissivism is to 
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What TAO is homing in on, to put it another way, is the quasi-akratic stance8 of the agent who, 
in addition to saying ‘there’s a plurality of belief states which it would be rational to hold towards P on the 
basis of E’, also wants to say ‘and as far as I’m concerned, my belief about P is a credence of 0.6’. For the 
proponent of TAO, it is this pair of attitudes that spells trouble for Permissivism. I cannot hold fast to 
just one of the doxastic attitudes, DA1, that can be rationally formed based on E, while at the same time 
thinking that this attitude lacks any general rational better-ness relative to another attitude, DA2, which I 
could have easily arrived at instead. And to be clear, the problem with this pair of attitudes is not just that 
the agent has a particular credence, while being uncertain about the rationality of having that credence; 
Elga (2013) shows that these kinds of mismatches between first-order and second-order doxastic attitudes 
needn’t be irrational. The problem in our case is about the particular nature of the mismatch between the 
agent’s first-order and second-order attitudes. The problem is that the agent holds a particular credence 
while thinking that it would be rational to accept both that credence and one or more others.   
2.2 White’s magical pill argument 
White sums up his version of TAO in a rhetorical question: if my current beliefs are, by my own lights, 
not rationally obligatory for me, why should I take propositions that I actually believe as a basis for action 
and reasoning, instead of others which I don’t believe but which, by my own lights, I would be rational in 
believing? (White 2005: 455). Of course White’s insinuation is that there is no satisfactory answer to this 
question. If I really do think DA1 and DA2 are both rational doxastic attitudes to hold towards P given E, 
then any reason I may have to privilege DA1 as my belief would be epistemically arbitrary. 
                                                          
see it as trying to shield agents from some of this rational toxicity, by allowing them to affirm the permissibility of other people’s 
assessments of the evidence without this automatically impugning the rationality of the agent’s own assessments. What the 
proponent of TAO is doing, then, is rejecting the logic of that shielding strategy. It say that if you consciously affirm the rationality 
of a rival assessment of the evidence, then the only way to rationalize holding firm in your assessment is to appeal to an arbitrary 
factor, one which has no proper bearing on judgments about the rationality of different assessments of the evidence. 
8 An epistemically akratic attitude is one in which an agent holds a belief, B, and also holds that B is unsupported by her evidence 
(Horowitz 2014). The kind of beliefs that I’m attributing to Permissivists don’t strictly qualify as akratic by that criterion, but they 
do have something important in common with akratic attitudes. The Permissivist, like the epistemically akratic agent, has a 
mismatch between her belief regarding P and her belief about the probative force of the evidence she has for P. The mismatch 
for the akratic agent is a fully-fledged conflict (e.g. ‘I believe P and that my evidence doesn’t support P’). The mismatch for the 
Permissivist is about breadth and narrowness (e.g. ‘I believe that my evidence recommends a credence for P in the range 0.51-
0.99, but my belief state with regards to P – rather than being expressed by a credence that encompasses that whole range – is 
expressed by some narrower determinate credence that falls within its boundaries’).  
7 
 
The main argument White uses to formulate TAO appeals to a thought experiment.9 Take a case 
in which, by the Permissivist’s lights, two different doxastic attitudes about P – let’s say, a credence of 0.2 
and a credence of 0.6 – are both permissible given evidence E. White then asks us to imagine that agent A 
is invited to take one of two magical pills. Taking either pill will cause A to have a determinate credence in 
P. One will give her a credence of 0.2 in P, the other will give her a credence of 0.6 in P. If A accepts the 
offer, she will take one of the two pills, although which one she takes will be settled by random selection. 
Now, according to White, doxastic attitudes formed via the pill-taking process cannot, upon reflection, be 
endorsed as rational. A can’t stand behind her belief about P if she’s aware that the belief was acquired via 
a chancy process, which may have just as easily resulted in her having a different belief about P. And this 
is true even if, by A’s own lights, the doxastic attitude she acquires via pill-popping falls within her range 
of permissible doxastic attitudes. The problem with pill-popping is that it makes A arbitrarily fix on one 
belief-state, DA1, which, while it is within the range of belief-states that A regards as rationally acceptable, 
nevertheless isn’t worthy of being elected to a privileged doxastic status just because it was selected via a 
flukey procedure. But here lies the problem for the Permissivist. If, instead of pill-popping, A acquires her 
doxastic attitude, DA1, in the normal way – i.e. by making a judgment about E’s probative force relative 
to P – this seems vulnerable to the same sort of complaint as the pill-popping method, given a permissive 
framework. As in the pill-popping case, A arrives at a determinate doxastic attitude, DA1, which is within 
her range of permissible doxastic attitudes. So far so good. But she arrives at it via a process – judging the 
force of the evidence – which, by her own lights, might have just as easily (and in a phenomenologically 
indistinguishable way) led her to have an entirely different doxastic attitude, DA2. From the Permissivist’s 
perspective, pill-popping and evidence-appraisal are both ways to acquire one among some plurality of 
rationally permissible doxastic attitudes, while leaving it to chance which particular doxastic attitude one 
acquires. As White says in a more recent discussion of these issues, the only way for you to endorse, on 
reflection, a belief that’s the output of such a process, is to suppose that you’re good at lucking into 
rational beliefs (White 2014: 316). Ergo, since Permissivism entails something absurd – namely, that it 
                                                          
9 What follows here is a tweaked presentation of the example White discusses in (2005: 448ff.). The main difference is that where 
White describes the scenario in terms of binary belief states (i.e. in which the agent either believes that P or that ~P), I describe 
the scenario in terms of credences, which represent doxastic attitudes as assignments of subjective probabilities to propositions. I 
favor this approach since it makes it easier to formulate the kind of practical problems that I’ll be discussing in §2.3, though it’s 
still possible for these sorts of problems to be generated in a binary-belief-state framework.   
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isn’t rationally mandatory to favor (i) forming beliefs by assessing the probative force of evidence, over 
(ii) forming beliefs through a random-selection, pill-popping method – it must be false. 
The general problem underlying the intuitions that White is pressing in the pill example can be 
stated as follows. If you’re committed to the view that there is a plurality of doxastic attitudes it would be 
permissible to hold towards P given E, having this commitment obliges you to deny the accuracy of any 
belief-forming process that picks out a single doxastic attitude towards P (among the set of permissible 
doxastic attitudes) and elects it to the privileged position of being your belief about P. The Permissivist 
must, after all, be appealing to some standards to ground her judgment that (e.g.) both 0.2 and 0.6 are 
among the set of credences that it’s rational to have towards P given E. But whatever those standards are, 
they will – if they’re being treated as fixed bases for further judgment – impugn the rationality of any 
process which says that it is only a credence 0.2, and not a credence of 0.6, that you should hold towards P 
given E. If you adhere to the standards that underwrite the initial permissive judgment about P, then you 
ought to reject any method of evidence-assessment that tells you to adopt one narrower doxastic attitude 
towards P. And if you think that what the evidence shows is that there is a 20-60% likelihood that P is 
true, then your doxastic attitude concerning P should reflect precisely that judgment about what the 
evidence shows (e.g. by expressing a concomitant credence interval). But in that case, you will have to 
reject – as unacceptably arbitrary – any doxastic attitude which fixes upon a single point within that 
interval of probabilities, in preference to all the other candidate points within that interval. 
2.3 Problems for Permissivists in practical decision-making 
As Sophie Horowitz observes in her work on epistemic akrasia (2014: 727), “the irrationality of an agent’s 
beliefs is often brought into sharper focus if we consider what happens when she puts her money where 
her mouth is”. White acknowledges this point with a discussion of how permissive sets of attitudes are 
liable to undermine legal verdicts. He sketches a case in which “the range of rationally permissible degrees 
of confidence in Smith’s guilt is just broad enough to include my own conviction [that Smith is guilty] as 
well as a degree of doubt that would make a vote of Not Guilty appropriate” (2005: 453). The permissive 
set of attitudes thus described seems highly unstable as a foundation for decision-making. I can issue the 
verdict that Smith is not guilty, thereby effectively disavowing my judgments about the probative force of 
the evidence. Or I can issue the verdict that he is guilty, contrary to my own acknowledgement that others 
would be fully rationally within their rights to issue the rival verdict. “Holding this moderately permissive 
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view”, White says, “either leads to the absurd consequence that it is appropriate to vote against one’s 
convictions, or it is self-undermining” (Ibid: 454). The point seems to me well-made. 
Here I want to present two new examples to further clarify what is rationally untenable about the 
kind of arbitrariness that arises in a permissive suite of attitudes. Like the above case, my examples do this 
by bringing in practical stakes. In my examples, however, the stakes are quantifiable. Consider: 
 
WAGER: Suppose that person A, in light of a body of evidence E, holds the following pair of 
attitudes about proposition P, which together constitute a permissive stance vis-à-vis E and P: 
 
(i) A credence of 0.6 in P, given E, and 
(ii) A judgment that it is rationally permissible to hold a credence of 0.2 in P, given E. 
 
Suppose, then, that A – knowing that further evidence will soon be acquired, which will decisively 
demonstrate P’s truth value – is invited to place a wager on P’s being true at odds of 2:1. 
 
Should A take a 2:1 wager on P’s truth, given the permissive set of attitudes that I have ascribed to her in 
the description of the case? The answer is unclear. On one hand, A judges that P is 60% likely to be true, 
and given that judgment, the expected payoff of taking a 2:1 wager on P’s truth is 20¢ for every $1.00 bet. 
So A should accept the wager. On the other hand, A judges that it is rationally permissible to think that P 
is 20% likely to be true, and given that probability estimate, a 2:1 bet on P’s truth carries with it an 
expected loss of 60¢ for every $1.00 bet. So, by A’s own lights, accepting the wager means acting in a way 
such that it would be rational to expect that loss. So A shouldn’t accept the wager. I don’t want to insist 
that there is perfect parity in the strength of the reasoning here. My point is just that it’s hard to see how 
A can practically decide between the recommendations, since they both arise, quite straightforwardly, out 
of her own judgments about the epistemic rationality of different doxastic attitudes towards P given E. So 
far as A’ permissive set of attitudes in WAGER leads to conflicting recommendations, which it seems 
difficult to resolve, we have reason to see that set of attitudes as untenable in some sense or other. 
Here is a structurally similar scenario with a different set of stakes. 
 
PORTFOLIO: Suppose A is given responsibility for managing an investment portfolio on behalf of B 
for an upcoming period of one year, and that – in light of the evidence available to her, E – A holds 
the following two beliefs about the expected value of some investment stock, S, over the year: 
 
(i) S will deliver a 10% return, and  
(ii) It would be rationally permissible to believe that S will incur a 30% loss. 
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Assume for the sake of argument that S is the only non-status-quo investment option available to A, 
and that B’s existing stock portfolio is holding steady in value. Also assume that A is exclusively 
motivated by the goal of maximizing returns for B’s investment portfolio in the year ahead. 
 
Should A invest B’s money in S? Again, it’s difficult to say how A should act in this scenario. On 
one hand, A believes S will deliver a 10% return. On the other hand, A believes that it’s rational to 
expect S to incur a 30% loss. Again, I don’t want to insist that there is perfect parity in the strength 
of the reasoning in either direction. The point is that it is hard to see how A can rationally arbitrate 
between the recommendations, since they both stem from her own beliefs. So again, insofar as A’s 
permissive set of attitudes in PORTFOLIO leads to irreconcilable recommendations about whether 
A should invest in S, we have reason to regard that set of attitudes as rationally untenable.10 
2.4 A satisficing resolution? 
The lesson from both cases, and also from White’s verdict example, is that A cannot have beliefs 
about whether P given evidence E, which are one hundred percent independent of her P-and-E-
related higher-order beliefs, that is, her beliefs about what it is rationally permissible to believe with 
respect to P given evidence E. If A is willing to declare that the doxastic attitude that she in fact 
affirms, DA1, is the only permissible doxastic attitude, then there’s no problem. But if A really 
insists that other doxastic attitudes – DA2, DA3, etc. – are rationally permissible, then her partial 
allegiance to these other attitudes, even if it’s just a matter of granting their rational permissibility, 
must in some sense undermine or ‘infect’ her purported allegiance to DA1. An agent can either 
endorse a permissive view about the probative force of E in relation to P, or she can affirm some 
determinate doxastic attitude about P in light of E. But doing both generates problems.  
Perhaps there’s a relatively simple way for the Permissivist to wriggle out of the bind that 
I’m trying to impose. David Enoch sketches a view on which “there is one degree of belief that is 
                                                          
10 In more recent work White (2014: 318–20) presents a case of seemingly untenably arbitrary judgment that ramps up the 
pragmatic stakes even higher. Suppose you are being chased by a dangerous animal, and you come to a fork in the road, where 
one path will lead you safely home, and the other one will lead you over a cliff. And suppose, given the evidence, you (i) believe 
that path A is the safe route, but also (ii) judge that it would be rationally permissible to believe that path B was the safe route. 
Via the kind of reasoning I sketch above, this set of attitudes allows you to reason to the conclusion both that you should (on 
pain of expected death!) take path A and that you should (on pain of expected death!) take path B. And the only way out of this 
bind, White says, is to say something like ‘the evidence more strongly supports the belief that path A is the safe route’, which 
resolves the practical problem, but does so by abandoning the permissive pair of judgments that generated it. 
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maximally rational, but some other degrees of belief – though less than maximally rational – are still 
rationally permissible” (2010: 957). This proposal resembles satisficing forms of consequentialism 
in ethics, distinguishing responses to the evidence that are rational in the sense of being ‘best’, from 
those that are rational in the sense of being ‘good enough’.11 And as Enoch says, there’s something 
natural about this way of cashing out a Permissivist framework. The Permissivist can say “given the 
evidence, my doxastic attitude towards P is rationally permissible (and it’s the best attitude, that’s 
why I hold it), your attitude towards P is also rationally permissible (only in the sense of being good 
enough), and that other person’s attitude towards P isn’t rationally permissible at all”. 
I don’t think this solves the problem, though. Any account of Permissivism modelled on 
satisficing faces a dilemma. The satisficer has to divide the set of doxastic attitudes that she regards 
as rationally permissible into two categories: (i) Worthy beliefs, i.e. those that she thinks merit her 
actual acceptance, and (ii) Okay beliefs, i.e. those she thinks don’t merit her acceptance, but whose 
rational permissibility she’s willing to grant. The dilemma arises when the satisficer tries to explain 
what distinguishes the Worthy belief from the Okay beliefs, for a particular proposition P and body 
of evidence E. Suppose A grants that the distinguishing consideration is something epistemically 
arbitrary. In that case TAO returns with full force, and the practical problems as in WAGER can’t 
be resolved by A treating her belief as decisive, since, by A’s own lights, her belief is based upon 
epistemically arbitrary factors. By contrast, suppose A thinks there is an epistemically relevant factor 
that renders the Worthy belief about P superior to the Okay belief about P, given E. In that case, 
it’s hard to see how A can maintain that others are (or would be) free from any epistemic blame for 
holding an Okay belief. To hold an Okay belief is, by A’s lights, to evince an apprehensible rational 
failure in one’s assessment of the relevant epistemic factors. And such failures are characteristically 
blameworthy, in a way that seems incompatible with calling them permissible – assuming the highly 
plausible principle that if φ-ing is permissible, then one isn’t blameworthy for φ-ing. The dilemmas 
in cases like WAGER can now be resolved, if this is how the satisficer distinguishes worthy beliefs 
from Okay beliefs. But the resolution is enabled because the Permissivist in question is no longer in 
a position to credibly maintain that the beliefs other than her own are rationally permissible. In 
                                                          
11 This proposal particularly resembles a view that’s an historical antecedent of satisficing consequentialism, from early modern 
moral thought, namely, ‘Probabilism’. Probabilists held that when A is choosing among a range of candidate acts, while being 
unsure about which is the right act, it’s permissible for A to perform any one which she judges has a good enough chance of 
being the right one, and this is regardless of whether there’s another act that A judges more likely to be right; see Hill (2009). 
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other words, if the satisficing approach resolves the problems generated by TAO, it does so only to 
the extent that it dissolves the commitments that distinguish Permissivism in the first place.  
3. The standards-based response to the arbitrariness objection 
3.1  Schoenfield’s response 
To rebut TAO, the Permissivist has to accomplish both of the following tasks. Task 1: she must identify 
something epistemically non-arbitrary about DA1 – that is, her doxastic attitude towards P given E – in 
light of which it’s rational for her to hold DA1 in preference to other prima facie eligible doxastic attitudes. 
However – Task 2 – she has to answer to the demands of Task 1 in a way that doesn’t lead to the non-
Permissivist view, that DA1 is in general rationally superior to these rival doxastic attitudes. 
Schoenfield presents an account of standards-based Permissivism that’s intended to satisfy these 
requirements. According to Schoenfield, in cases where you judge that DA1 and DA2 are both rationally 
permissible doxastic attitudes to hold towards P given E, it needn’t be arbitrary for you to affirm DA1 as 
your belief state, and you can have an explanation of why forming your belief by appraising the evidence 
is a better method than randomly selecting one option among the set of belief-states that are permissible 
by your lights. Schoenfield thinks you can say something like the following. ‘I hold DA1 because it is the 
doxastic attitude that’s enjoined by my epistemic standards, ES1. But there is another rationally acceptable 
set of epistemic standards, ES2, which recommends a different doxastic attitude towards P given E, DA2. 
And it’s rationally permissible for an agent using ES2 to hold DA2.’ This move seemingly addresses Task 
1, because the consideration that’s appealed to in support of believing DA1 – namely, the fact that DA1 is 
enjoined by the epistemic standards you regard as optimally truth-conducive – looks like an epistemically 
non-arbitrary reason to favor DA1 over DA2. And this move seemingly addresses Task 2 as well. You’re 
not obliged to say that DA2 is rationally impermissible compared to DA1, because the rational status of 
any doxastic attitude is assessed relative to the agent’s epistemic standards, and if the epistemic standards 
that enjoin DA2 are rationally permissible, then DA2 itself is rationally permissible as well. 
What are epistemic standards, exactly, and what does it mean to employ a given set of epistemic 
standards? Epistemic standards, for Schoenfield’s purposes (2014: 199), are simply methods for forming 
beliefs based on evidence; ‘functions from bodies of evidence to doxastic states’. And to adopt standards 
ES1 as your own, means to use ES1 to form beliefs from your evidence, and to do so because you judge 
that this will reliably lead you to form doxastic attitudes that express a high degree of confidence in truths 
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and a low degree of confidence in falsehoods. Now, as Schoenfield concedes, you make a peculiar set of 
judgments when you adopt one set of epistemic standards, ES1, while accepting the rationality of some 
alternative set, ES2. To adopt ES1 is to regard these standards as optimally truth-conducive, and thus better 
than ES2 in some sense.12 At the same, though, there’s also a sense in which you can regard ES2 as just as 
good as ES1. Different sets of epistemic standards weight different epistemic considerations differently – 
for instance, they can give more or less priority to believing the true relative to disbelieving the false13 – 
and for at least some such considerations, there isn’t any viewpoint-independent way to evaluate the 
comparative merits of alternative weightings. Rational capacities are, as Schoenfield stresses, general-purpose, 
insofar as they aid agents in making judgments, conducting inferences, and appraising evidence across a 
wide range of circumstances and in response to many different forms of information. Different epistemic 
standards can serve different agents sufficiently well, with respect to their truth-conduciveness, across 
these different contexts. And thus, while an agent will naturally regard her own epistemic standards as 
optimally truth-conducive, she can also maintain that it’s rationally permissible to employ some rival set 
of epistemic standards. That is the type of picture that Schoenfield proposes, at any rate.     
3.2 Why TAO applies to Schoenfield’s standards-based Permissivism 
One doesn’t have to dig far beneath the surface to unearth the difficulties that this picture brings with it, 
insofar as it’s supposed to underpin a response to TAO. Schoenfield states the worry as follows. 
 
What reason does [the agent] have for thinking that she is more likely to end up with a true belief by 
weighting the evidence her way, using her standards, rather than in some alternative way, if both ways 
are [by the agent’s own lights] rationally permissible? (Schoenfield 2014: 201)14 
 
                                                          
12 One might ask what underpins the agent’s judgments about the truth-conduciveness of her epistemic standards and other rival 
epistemic standards. For Schoenfield, judgments like these in fact self-referentially rely on the agent’s acceptance of her own 
favored epistemic standards. I explain and examine Schoenfield’s reasons for taking this view in §3.2. 
13 On this point, see for instance Riggs (2008). Kelly (2014, §2) suggests (though ultimately doesn’t endorse) a defence of 
Permissivism that appeals to the possibility of different – but equally permissible – weightings of these epistemic goals as the 
agent’s justification for judging two different doxastic attitudes towards P given E as equally rationally permissible. 
14 In this quotation I’ve added in the words ‘by the agent’s own lights’ just to make it as clear as possible that the problem here 
emerges as a result of attitudes that the Permissivist is supposed to consciously endorse.   
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Where before our problem was arbitrarily favoring one among two rationally permissible doxastic 
attitudes, now our problem is arbitrarily favoring one among two rationally permissible sets of epistemic 
standards. The problems of TAO recur for Schoenfield at the level of epistemic standards.  
Or so it seems. An adequate response to this problem is in the offing, I believe, but the response 
that Schoenfield provides doesn’t quite achieve what’s required of it. Her response begins by noting that 
the Permissivist, A, who regards both ES1 and ES2 as rationally permissible epistemic standards, can favor 
ES1 – and the doxastic attitudes it endorses – over ES2, if and insofar as she judges that ES1 is optimally 
truth-conducive, whereas ES2 is merely adequately truth-conducive. There’s nothing unacceptably dogmatic 
about these kinds of judgments, Schoenfield insists, because it is simply ‘an inescapable fact of epistemic 
life’ that we judge our own epistemic standards to be the best ones (by the lights of those same standards) 
and that we’re unable to adduce compelling reasons in support of such judgments that are independent of 
our own standards (Ibid: 202). Call this the No Independent Justification constraint, or NIJ.15 
Let’s assume for the sake of argument that NIJ does indeed hold with the degree of generality that 
Schoenfield suggests. The core of the problem with appealing to NIJ, in this context, is that it leaves A in 
a position from which it is very hard for her to substantiate her professed view regarding DA2, namely, 
that it is rationally permissible to accept DA2, given E, even though A herself rejects it. 
To see why, note firstly that there’s no sense in the Permissivist appealing to the idea of epistemic 
standards to try to resolve TAO, unless she’s going to be invoking rival epistemic standards, ES2, as part 
of her explanation of what makes it rationally permissible to adopt DA2. If A’s own epistemic standards, 
ES1, affirm the rational permissibility of both DA2 and DA1 – the latter being the doxastic attitude that A 
actually holds – without even any reference to some rival set of epistemic standards, ES2, then we’re back 
to square one with the arbitrariness problem. If this is the situation, then A is contemplating two eligible 
doxastic attitudes towards P given E, both of which are rationally permissible according to ES1 – i.e. A’s 
own epistemic standards, from which all of A’s judgments derive – and neither of which can be privileged 
as A’s belief regarding P unless an epistemically arbitrary factor is brought in to adjudicate. 
                                                          
15 Here’s a view that is in the general vicinity of Schoenfield’s position. Agents with different epistemic standards may be subject 
to a kind of epistemic incommensurability. That is, there may be no common basis of comparison that either agent can appeal to in 
order to defend the superiority of her standards, in a way that her rival will recognize as rationally compelling by her own lights. 
According to Lynch (2010) only pragmatic comparisons can be used to assess the relative merits of epistemically 
incommensurable doxastic methods. Whatever might be said about that strategy, though, it won’t suffice as a response to TAO. 
This is because any pragmatic reason to favor a set of epistemic methods is, by definition – unless we collapse the distinction 
between epistemic and practical rationality – an arbitrary consideration, epistemically speaking.    
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So, in order for A to vindicate her professed position, that DA2 is rationally permissible, A needs 
to offer an explanation of DA2’s rationally permissibility which is built around the premise that DA2 is the 
doxastic attitude which is endorsed by some rival set of epistemic standards, ES2. And A must be able to 
endorse the rationality of ES2 while she carries on in applying her own standards, ES1. 
The problem with this is that once A has cited the NIJ constraint as her basis for favoring ES1 
over ES2, it seems that she shouldn’t accord any weight to ES2’s recommendations. After all, NIJ says that 
ES1 is the reference point from which all of A’s judgments about the rationality of epistemic standards are 
derived; if we assume NIJ, then ES2’s merits, from A’s perspective, are entirely determined by what ES1 
says about ES2. And those determining standards, ES1, say at least both of the following things about ES2: 
(i) that the doxastic attitude endorsed by ES2 in the case at hand is not the most accurate one, and (ii) that 
using ES2 in general will result in an agent adopting less accurate doxastic attitudes than using ES1 would. 
In short, from the perspective of ES1, ES2 has apprehensible deficiencies with respect to the accuracy of 
the doxastic attitudes it endorses. And in light of those deficiencies, it is natural to regard the adoption of 
ES2 as liable to some kind of epistemic blame, and therefore – assuming the highly plausible principle that 
if φ-ing is permissible, then one isn’t blameworthy for φ-ing – as not rationally permissible. 
To be clear, Schoenfield will reject this inference. She explicitly denies that epistemic standards 
have to be optimally accurate or truth-conducive in their recommendation of doxastic attitudes in order 
to qualify as rationally permissible. And stated in the abstract her view seems plausible, particularly for 
anyone who comes at the issue with permissive intuitions. On Schoenfield’s view, principles of rationality 
say what considerations count in favor of what beliefs, and it is at least possible for two agents to both be 
reliably paying attention to the same (correct) considerations in forming their views, while weighting those 
considerations differently, such that they sometimes arrive at different views, even while both doing what 
rationality demands of them (Ibid: 202). Still, however much it seems reasonable, in the abstract, to prise 
apart accuracy and rational permissibility in evaluating epistemic standards, there seems to be something 
decidedly odd about A doing this while she’s in the midst of a concrete dispute in which she’s reflectively 
affirming (i) the superior accuracy of her standards, ES1, compared to ES2, as well as (ii) the apprehensible 
deficiencies of ES2, vis-à-vis accuracy, by the lights of ES1. (Recall also that, given the NIJ constraint, A 
cannot but arrive at these kinds of judgments, (i) and (ii), about ES2’s deficiencies relative to ES1.) 
Of course it is open to Schoenfield to insist that when it comes to epistemic standards, accuracy 
and rationality can come apart in a way that doesn’t disallow these kinds of combinations of judgments. 
There will be further problems to negotiate in maintaining this view. Presumably a great enough degree of 
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inaccuracy in epistemic standards will have to disqualify those standards from being counted as rationally 
permissible, and it’s not clear whether any principled explanation can be given to distinguish between the 
inaccurate epistemic standards that are rational and those that aren’t. In any case, I haven’t said enough to 
decisively show that Schoenfield’s position is untenable. It’s certainly not self-contradictory – or a denial 
of an analytic truth – to say that one can rationally accept epistemic standards even if they aren’t optimally 
truth-conducive. But there are costs that come along with this position and which strongly militate against 
it. It requires us to have a conception of epistemic standards on which an agent can endorse the rational 
permissibility of epistemic standards even while recognising deficiencies in those standards which, to all 
intents and purposes, seem like the sort of deficiencies that normally merit epistemic blame. 
3.3 The interaction between epistemic standards and cognitive abilities 
In light the above, the challenge for the Permissivist who aims to resolve TAO by appealing to epistemic 
standards is as follows. First, she must explain her acceptance of DA2’s rational permissibility by appeal to 
the fact that DA2 is endorsed by ES2 – that is, by epistemic standards other than her own – because if her 
own epistemic standards endorse DA2’s rational permissibility, TAO immediately recurs. Second, in order 
to defend her judgment about DA2’s rational permissibility, in light of its endorsement by ES2, she must 
find a way to vindicate the claim that ES2 really is rationally acceptable, like her own epistemic standards, 
ES1. But then, third, her explanation of ES2’s rational acceptability must still leave her with the space to 
identify some epistemically non-arbitrary factor which justifies her in favoring ES1 over ES2.  
How can the Permissivist square this circle? The answer lies in an appeal to the idea that there is 
some kind of interaction between the epistemic standards we adopt, i.e. the methods via which we form 
beliefs based on the evidence, and our cognitive abilities, i.e. the abilities that we put into practice in the 
application of our epistemic standards. Analogically, the idea is that the truth-conduciveness of an agent’s 
epistemic software depends on what kind of cognitive hardware that agent is working with. Consider agent 
A, and her particular set of cognitive abilities, CA1. It may be rationally preferable for A to use a particular 
set of epistemic standards, ES1, insofar as these are – for an agent operating with CA1 – the most truth-
conducive standards via which to form beliefs from the evidence. But where that’s the consideration that 
A appeals to in order to defend her adoption of ES1, A can reconcile this appeal with her judgment that 
certain rival standards, ES2, are no less truth-conducive per se than ES1, since the truth-conduciveness of 
both ES1 and ES2 depends on the cognitive abilities of the agents employing those standards. 
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 Here’s an example to illustrate, which I’ll call DETECTIVES. Veronica Mars and Nancy Drew 
are investigating a crime for which X and Y are the prime suspects. After thoroughly reviewing the same 
body of relevant evidence, Mars believes it’s 70% likely X is the culprit and 30% likely Y is the culprit, 
whereas Drew believes it’s 30% likely X is the culprit and 70% likely Y is the culprit. Can both detectives 
regard the other’s views as rationally permissible, while also asserting the rationality of their own doxastic 
attitudes about X and Y’s guilt? Can they be permissive? Yes. Suppose firstly that Mars and Drew employ 
different epistemic standards, i.e. they use different methods for assessing and interpreting their evidence 
in order to form their beliefs. Suppose, for instance, that they have different methods for evaluating the 
probative force of testimonial evidence, a type of evidence that’s often an important part of the data they 
examine as detectives. Mars is excellent at recognizing insincere testimony – she’s very sensitive to various 
subtle verbal and non-verbal tell-tale markers of insincerity – and thus she interprets different instances of 
testimony differently, ascribing a different probative force to insincere testimonial evidence. Drew is not 
very good at identifying insincere testimony, but she is excellent at making holistic, gestalt assessments of 
the combined probative implications of large bodies of disparate evidence. So unlike Mars, Drew doesn’t 
pre-sort the testimonial evidence, based on its sincerity. Where Mars reviews the testimonial evidence in 
sequence, identifying each item’s probative force in its own right, Drew reviews all testimonial evidence in 
the same light, and assesses the probative force of the testimonial data as a set. Mars applies her standards 
because she’s cognitively well-equipped to apply them. She has the kind of perceptual and attentional 
abilities that enable her to accurately judge the sincerity of testimony. In a similar way, Drew is cognitively 
well-equipped to apply her standards. She has a particular imaginative facility that enables her to formulate 
credible explanatory narratives, based on gestalt interpretations of diverse bodies of evidence. Now here’s 
the final, crucial detail. Although Mars and Drew are working together for the first time, they have a long 
track-record of working independently on other cases. And in light of their track-records, both of them 
have good reason to believe that when they apply their own epistemic standards, in forming beliefs about 
cases relevantly similar to the case at hand, they are very likely to get the answer right. In short, each of 
them is in the position of (i) having a combination of cognitive abilities and epistemic standards which 
reliably generates accurate beliefs, and (ii) having good reason to believe that this is the case. 
 Under these conditions it seems rational for each party to apply her own epistemic standards to 
the evidence and adopt the beliefs endorsed by those standards. Each detective uses epistemic standards 
that are optimally truth-conducive for her, given her cognitive abilities, and given the felicitous interaction 
between her epistemic standards and those cognitive abilities. At the same time, each of them would be 
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able – if all the above facts were made available to them – to see that the other is in the same position, of 
using epistemic standards that are optimally truth-conducive for her, given her cognitive abilities, and 
therefore that the other is reasoning well in adopting the doxastic attitudes endorsed by her standards. So, 
despite having different doxastic attitudes in the case at hand, Mars and Drew could at least in principle 
regard each other’s judgments as fully epistemically rational. And they can recognize that the other party’s 
epistemic standards and the beliefs formed in light of them are rational, in a way that need not undermine 
their faithfulness to their own epistemic standards and the beliefs enjoined by them. This is because each 
of them can appreciate that the truth-conduciveness of the epistemic standards in question depends upon 
the cognitive abilities of the agent by whom they are employed. They can both appreciate, then, that in a 
pair-wise comparison, neither Drew’s standards nor Mars’s standards are more truth-conducive per se, or 
rationally superior per se. And therefore, although there is an epistemically non-arbitrary consideration that 
justifies each agent in applying her own epistemic standards and standing by the doxastic attitudes that 
they enjoin, it is one that still allows both agents to affirm the rationality of each other’s beliefs.16 
4. The limitations of standards-based Permissivism 
4.1 Conciliationism and the practical problems revisited 
Here are two worries one might have about how the kind of standards-based Permissivism I’ve sketched 
above would operate in practice. First, if making sense of Permissivism in any particular case requires us 
to recognize a host of further considerations about the different (but equally good) cognitive abilities and 
epistemic standards of the two agents, as in DETECTIVES, these further considerations may change the 
case into something like a paradigmatic example of peer disagreement. In cases where there is a seeming 
                                                          
16 To spell out Permissivism in this way is to allow an inter-personal Permissivist stance (where, given E, A affirms DA1 but also 
affirms the rational permissibility of B affirming DA2), but not necessarily an intra-personal Permissivist stance (where, given E, A 
affirms DA1 but also affirms the rational permissibility of herself affirming DA2) (see Kelly 2014, §3). This is no real shortcoming, 
though, since it doesn’t deprive permissive epistemological views like Bayesianism and Conservativism of anything to which they 
were committed. Note also that once Permissivism is spelled out in a way that has agents’ different cognitive abilities doing some 
explanatory work, it bears a resemblance to approaches (e.g. White 2009) which invite agents to think of their own belief-forming 
process as instruments (e.g. thermometers), whose deliverances can be taken as evidence in their own right. What’s different here 
is that the idea of myself as a kind of reliable belief-forming instrument is not being used to try to judge which of two views is 
rational, but rather to justify my adherence to one of two views which are both, by my lights, rational.  
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parity in the epistemic credentials of two agents disagreeing about some proposition, the Conciliationist will 
say that the two agents should revise their doxastic attitudes towards a middle ground view (see §1). And 
any rational obligation to make such revisions seems to alter the case such that it’s no longer permissive. 
The second problem is that it’s not obvious how my proposed form of standards-based Permissivism can 
resolve pragmatic dilemmas like those discussed in §2.3. If Mars thinks it’s 70% likely X is the culprit and 
30% likely that Y is, but also thinks that Drew is rational in believing it’s 30% likely that X is the culprit 
and 70% likely that Y is, should Mars accept a 2:1 wager on X being the culprit? The gamble seems vexed 
much like the cases of WAGER and PORTFOLIO in §2.3. Mars thinks X is 70% likely to be the culprit, 
and given that likelihood the expected payoff of taking the wager is 40¢ for every $1.00 bet. But Mars also 
thinks Drew is rational in believing that X is 30% likely to be the culprit, and if that probability judgment 
is granted the wager has an expected loss of 40¢ for every $1.00 bet. So the problem remains.  
 One way that a standards-based Permissivist could respond to such concerns would be to say 
more about the indirect epistemic benefits that result from people ‘sticking to their guns’ in the face of 
disagreement. Plenty of authors have suggested that in certain contexts there are epistemic goods that are 
better served if there is some diversity in people’s beliefs.17 Jonathan Matheson (2015: 145 ff.) calls the 
type of considerations that arise from this ‘instrumental epistemic reasons’; Brian Talbot (2014) calls them 
‘truth-promoting non-evidential reasons for belief’. It seems plausible that such considerations can at least 
sometimes be regarded as reasons for belief of some sort, and so perhaps in a case like DETECTIVES an 
agent could appeal to them to resolve the pragmatic deadlocks I’ve adverted to. Still, even in cases where 
such reasons could be invoked, the prevalent view would be that they cannot properly be characterized as 
epistemic reasons for belief; that they are, rather, merely pragmatic reasons (see Berker 2013). It would be too 
great a detour here for me to try to comprehensively address this claim, but suffice it to say, if our strategy 
for defending Permissivism necessitates a defence of a position that’s antecedently less plausible and less 
likely to be granted than Permissivism itself, then that strategy seems fairly unpromising. 
                                                          
17 These suggestions draw on a familiar view about the social dynamics of inquiry, on which disagreements and antagonisms are 
seen as salutary influences on the aims of inquiry. The idea, in Earl Conee’s words, is that “real cognitive advances” are promoted 
when epistemically well-credentialed people “take a side” in a debate – arguing for their pet view, seeking further support for it, 
objecting to its rivals – which generates “an instrumental sort of intellectual justification” for such doxastic conduct (2009: 322). 
This views political significance was famously described by Mill in On Liberty. It figures prominently in some contemporary 
accounts of the character of scientific inquiry (e.g. Kitcher 1993), and some authors in the epistemology of disagreement 
literature (e.g. Elgin 2010) appeal to it as part of the justification for anti-Conciliationist responses to disagreement. 
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The right way for a standards-based Permissivist to handle these kinds of problems, I think, is by 
distinguishing two types of circumstances that agents may find themselves in while trying to reflectively 
maintain a permissive perspective on a disagreement. Assume that in both types of circumstances the key 
conditions I outlined in relation to DETECTIVES hold: each of the agents is using epistemic standards 
that are optimally truth-conducive for her, given (i) her cognitive abilities, and (ii) the felicitous interaction 
between her standards and her cognitive abilities. The difference between the two types of circumstances 
is that in one the agents only have detailed knowledge about their own epistemic standards and cognitive 
abilities, i.e. what those epistemic standards consist in, how they’re used to assess the probative force of 
evidence, how they interact with different kinds of cognitive abilities, and when these interactions do and 
don’t lead to accuracy. Whereas, let’s stipulate, in the other type of circumstances the agents have such 
knowledge about their own – and each other’s – epistemic standards and cognitive abilities. 
In the second type of circumstances the rational pressure on the agents to revise their beliefs in a 
conciliatory fashion will be stronger, and may ultimately oblige them to converge on one shared doxastic 
attitude. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a full account of the conditions under which such 
conciliatory belief-revision is rationally required. One way or the other, though, it seems plausible that in 
at least some cases in which an agent knows of her counterpart’s track-record of accuracy – and has good 
reason in light of this to think her counterpart is as likely as herself to be accurately judging the probative 
force of the evidence in the case at hand – conciliatory belief revision will be rationally required, in a way 
that unravels the initial permissive set of attitudes that the Permissivist was trying to defend.  
But the same is not true in the first type of circumstances, in which the agents only have detailed 
knowledge about their own epistemic standards and cognitive abilities. Under such circumstances, agent 
A can have good reason to believe that in holding DA1 towards P given E, she is in fact applying epistemic 
standards that are optimally truth-conducive for her given her cognitive abilities. Granted, she might also 
have good reason to believe that another agent, B, who holds DA2 towards P given E could, in principle, be 
doing so as a result of her applying different epistemic standards, ES2, which might be optimally truth-
conducive for her (B), given the different set of cognitive abilities she has to work with. But without A 
herself having the cognitive abilities she would need to felicitously apply ES2, and without her being in a 
position to confidently appraise the accuracy of ES2 when applied by an agent who has those cognitive 
abilities, A seems justified in remaining steadfast in DA1, and in treating that attitude as the basis for any 
practical decision-making linked to the relevant proposition. And all this is consistent with A accepting, in 
principle, that B’s situation may ostensibly be the same from B’s perspective, and also that if she (A) did 
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learn that B – with her different cognitive abilities – had a track-record of accuracy in applying ES2 that 
was equal to A’s track-record of accuracy in applying ES1, this would give both of them some kind of 
reason to revise their beliefs in a conciliatory manner. One can be a standards-based Permissivist, of the 
kind I’ve described in §3.3, while still conceding that, under particular circumstances, the disagreement of 
other agents with a known track-record of accuracy can generate conciliatory pressures. 
When it comes time for the Permissivist to act under the guidance of her beliefs, there may still 
be some residual unease in holding DA1 while thinking that others could be rational in holding DA2. But 
this disquiet may be partly alleviated by reflecting again on the relation between epistemic standards and 
cognitive abilities. Consider how a Permissivist who isn’t accustomed to thinking of things in this way – 
let’s say, a run-of-the-mill Bayesian, B – is going to try to make sense of the uneasy feeling of arbitrariness 
when practical dilemmas arise. If B judges that DA1 and DA2 are both rational doxastic attitudes to hold 
towards P given E, she will regard the discrepancy – between her acceptance of DA1, and someone else’s 
acceptance of DA2 – as a result of them having different prior probability distributions. Now, naturally B 
will see herself as rationally entitled to her priors. But still, when the practical dilemmas arise, and make 
these worries about arbitrariness more salient, it’s difficult for B not to regard it as some kind of accident 
that she should have those priors, rather than the other ones which, after conditionalizing on E, would 
have resulted in her holding DA2 instead of DA1. There is no deeper fact about herself that B can look to 
in order to sustain a sense of proprietary connection to her priors – they’re simply the ones she happened 
to have. It should be welcome news for the Permissivist, then, to be given explanatory resources that help 
her to have a sense of proprietary connection with her doxastic attitudes under such circumstances. The 
standards-based Permissivist needn’t see it as just an accident that she holds her beliefs. This is because (i) 
her cognitive abilities are a part of her identity, and (ii) her acceptance of DA1 owes to her having those 
cognitive abilities, since DA1 is endorsed by epistemic standards whose fittingness for her is due to her 
cognitive abilities. The standards-based Permissivist has an answer to the critic who says that in sticking 
to her own judgment she’s doing something entirely arbitrary. And that’s some kind of progress. 
4.2 A less permissive Permissivism? 
Several prominent epistemological views – like Bayesianism, Coherentism, and Conservatism – are tacitly 
committed to Permissivism (see note 2). All these views, in their typical forms, tell us that the probative 
force of evidence E in relation to proposition P depends on factors that differ between different agents. 
And they all resist the notion of there being some uniquely-rationally-privileged agential standpoint, from 
which objective evidential support-relations for any values of P and E can be judged. The problem that 
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TAO raises for such views is about how to understand the combination of attitudes that a self-conscious, 
reflective Permissivist needs to maintain. And this is where a standards-based approach – one that links 
epistemic standards to agent-specific cognitive abilities – offers some help. It helps explain why it needn’t 
be epistemically arbitrary for A to hold DA1 in preference to DA2, even while A resolutely maintains that 
DA2 is no less rationally permissible than DA1. Notice, however, that the moves we are introducing to 
counter TAO will generate more stringent caveats for the doxastic license that Permissivism issues. It’s 
not enough for the agent to say: ‘you seem to have arrived at your belief via rational methods, and I seem 
to have arrived at my belief via rational methods, so we’re both entitled to believe as we do, and also to 
affirm the rationality of each other’s beliefs’. If I’m a Permissivist I now have to bite at least two further 
bullets. I need some reason to think (i) that our different views are due to us having different cognitive 
abilities and applying different epistemic standards, and (ii) that the use of my epistemic standards is 
optimally truth-conducive for me, given the cognitive abilities that I have to work with in the application 
of my epistemic standards. And if it’s rare for these conditions to obtain, then we’ll only rarely be able to 
defend permissive sets of attitudes from the arbitrariness worries we’ve been considering.  
Or so it appears. Whether a standards-based form of Permissivism ends up being painted into 
this corner depends upon what kind of epistemic modifiers are (or ought to be) applied to the qualifying 
conditions (i) and (ii), in order for an agent to activate this defence of a permissive stance. In short, the 
question is whether the agent needs to know – or be highly confident – that conditions (i) and (ii) obtain, 
or whether some weaker epistemic criterion is sufficient, like having a pro tanto good reason to believe that 
the conditions obtain. If the stringent standard is the right one, then permissive sets of attitudes will rarely 
be justifiable in real-world cases. As Nathan King notes, in a discussion of how these sorts of judgments 
bear on the epistemic significance of disagreement, it’s difficult enough to see how our doxastic attitudes 
arise out of our evidence and our methods of evidence assessment (2012: 267–68). It’s presumably going 
to be even more difficult to make confident assessments about what kind of cognitive abilities agents are 
working with, and about how the truth-conduciveness of a particular set of epistemic standards is affected 
by the interplay between those epistemic standards and a certain suite of cognitive abilities.  
Having said all that, I think the less stringent criterion above is the more appropriate one. All the 
Permissivist ever needed was some kind of epistemically non-arbitrary factor – some kind of tie-breaker, so 
to speak – to justify her commitment to DA1 alongside her affirmation of DA2’s rational permissibility. 
And it seems like she has such a tie-breaker, as long as she has some pro tanto good reason to believe that 
the qualifying conditions (i) and (ii) obtain in the case under consideration. In effect, what the reflective 
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Permissivist has to do to respond to TAO, once she has consciously affirmed the rational permissibility 
of person B’s view, DA2, is ask herself the following questions: (i) do I have any reason to think that mine 
and B’s different doxastic attitudes vis-à-vis P owe to our applying different epistemic standards to the 
relevant evidence? And (ii) do I have any reason to believe that my epistemic standards are the more 
truth-conducive ones for me to employ, given my particular suite of cognitive abilities? If both of these 
questions can be answered in the affirmative, then the Permissivist has the tie-breaker she requires in 
order to avoid arbitrariness in holding DA1 while also granting DA2’s rational permissibility. 
Still, affirmative answers to these questions aren’t too cheaply available. The kind of standards-
based version of Permissivism on offer here is permissive, but it’s far from indulgent. And this is, I’d 
suggest, the kind of Permissivism that it makes sense to want. It’s a familiar mindset to think something 
like ‘your appraisal of the evidence seems reasonable, but so does mine, so let’s just say that both of us 
have rational beliefs’. The worry is what you will say when someone asks why you’re favoring your view 
over the other one which – so you say! – is no less rational? What’s disallowed by the kind of Permissivism 
that I’m espousing is the apathetic shrug. It’s not enough to say ‘I can’t pin down any good epistemic 
reason for favoring my belief over the other, but it’s what I think, so that’s that’. We may feel sympathy 
for the notion that, as Richard Fumerton puts it, “in the final analysis, there really is no alternative to the 
egocentric perspective” (2010: 106). But it doesn’t follow from this that there’s no middle-ground view 
between an indulgent Permissivism that says ‘I’m rational and so are you, because rationality comes fairly 
cheap’, and an irresponsible egocentrism in which the agent sees herself as the bearer of some ineffable, 
truth-conducive source of insight. A standards-based version of Permissivism – one which addresses 
TAO by positing an interaction between epistemic standards and cognitive abilities – shows how an agent 
can affirm the rationality of other people’s doxastic attitudes, while being non-arbitrarily steadfast in her 
own doxastic attitudes. But it forces her to work harder a bit harder for this, and that’s no bad thing. 
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